Is Moran correct to conclude that ‘The European Union, far from being only an important external influence, is now woven into the everyday fabric of t

Traditionally, Britain distinguished very clearly between domestic and internal contexts, but involvement in the EEC in 1973 and a host of other EU bodies has seriously eroded this implicit framework. As a result, policy making in Britain turns to centre increasingly on the agreements, commitments and directives imposed by the EU which puts the UK in a new situation were it is more subject than ever in history to Europeans obligations and restrictions.
The historical step toward Europe has direct and indirect implications for Britain both in terms of ‘submission’ and adaptation to the EU, and in the British attempt to shape the policies undertaken by the supranational body.
In July 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) generated a great expansion in the powers of the European institutions, thus the EU was not longer only a unified system of economic government. Later on, the Treaties of Maastricht in 1992 and of Amsterdam in 1997 strengthened European capacity in foreign, defence and social policy, the QMV was introduced for some policy-decision makings but each state conserved the veto power for ‘key red-line’ areas.

Perhaps because of the close relation with the US or because of UK’s imperial history, Britain has always been seen as an ‘awkward partner’, a eurosceptic, and a focus for resistance within the EU integration. ‘Complicating matters further is the fact that, unlike France, which took a lead in Europe as one of the early member of the Community, Britain has been a late-comer, having joint the EEC in 1973, and has been a ’reluctant partner’ at that.’[1]
British politicians, Medias and population have shown and show themselves sceptic of joining the single currency, of deepening the development of EU institutions because they are attached to the sovereignty of the Houses of Commons. In addition, ‘The British have expressed fears of a federal European ‘superstate’, imposing policies that threaten national sovereignty and democracy.’[2]

To fully understand contemporary British politics it is essential to understand the place the UK has inside the EU. It is now broadly undeniable that processing policy in the core executive demands the coordination of EU policy within government.
The Europeanization of governance in the British political life can be understood in different ways: as an enforced obligation to follow EU laws, as an adaptation of the UK through national policies and reforms, or as a feedback in which influences go in a two-way direction not only vertically (EU-UK) but also horizontally (other nation states). Scholars do not agree in what way today EU integration is pursued. On the one hand, ‘intergovernmentalists’ see that the European Union is and has been engineered by states( including the UK since the 1970s), consequently they argue that through integration governments actually acquired more national sovereignty and autonomy as a consequence of the growth of the EU institutions. On the other hand, ‘transformationalists’ claim that states remain important ‘sites of loyalty and policy output’, but they declare that nations are embedded in a multilevel governance in which they co-exist with other member states at the European level. Moreover, in the long term, they ‘suggest the birth of a supranational system that either replaces or sits alongside the domestic polities of member states.’[3]

But all this do not shed light on Moran’s conclusion which argues that the nature of everyday politics in the UK is increasingly interwoven with the European integration. Is this statement exaggerated? Is EU influence as great as expressed by Moran? Are we dealing with a one-way influence or does Britain also influences European construction? Is the British system wholly woven with the EU?
To better analyse these questions we shall first focus on the examples of influence of the EU on the British political system that have driven Moran to such conclusion. In a second step we shall treat the facts that might undermine Moran’s assumptions of the highly interconnection between the supranational entity and the UK.



Moran explains that there are formal and informal ways by which the EU influences Britain. On the one hand, the formal influence is developed by treaties, directives and court ruling. The first one, the existence of economic treaties, explains why the UK can not impose tariffs on goods coming from other EU countries and of course the other way around. Concerning the directives, Moran argues that the most important instrument by which the Union legislate on policies are these ‘directives’ which are generated by the European Parliament or the Commission. Perhaps the most important institution in the EU is the Commission. It is the principal initiator of policy proposals, it scrutinizes all subsidies paid by government not to infringe the Union’s competition rules and it is the head of negotiation with the WTO and other international trade and cooperation agreements.
Although directives are translated into law at national level allowing a large area of discretion to states to manoeuvre and adapt them to each country, it is the EU who ‘sets the rhythm of the melody’ and not the UK.
Finally, the last formal way of influence the EU exercises over the UK is through court rulings. Court rulings enable to create law by interpreting the meaning of the translated legislation in particular circumstances.
On the other hand, indirect meanings of influence from the EU, Moran explains, can be the reputation of commissioners, the allocation of resources in different regions to different kind of projects and the propaganda and the public relations.

The economic dimension of the single free-market requires Britain’s government fabric of policies to be interwoven with EU policies. In effect, the first and perhaps the most important way of relation that comes to our mind between the supranational body and the UK, though not the only one, is the single market. The single market centres on the freedoms for free movement for people, goods, services and capital. Concerning foreign economic policy, ‘since the EU is a single trading unit, all important trade negotiations have to be carried on by the Union collectively.’[4]
The EU is a customs union what means that common external tariffs are operated by the Commission of the EU. British trade policy is now wholly Europeanized because of the existence of a common commercial policy and the creation of a single voice in international trade negotiations. Furthermore, the EU model of economic integration follows principles of budgetary discipline, deregulation and privatization which every country must apply to their economies.
The European Union permeates different aspects in the British political and economic life. For instance, the market for labour is now subject to the Union‘s jurisdiction and not the British one. This includes health and safety at work, aspects of collective bargaining and working hours (now at a maximum of 48 hours per week).
‘In terms of economic management, the increasing regionalisation and devolution of British government, combined with the availability of resources for key policy purposes from Brussels (for example through the European Regional Developmental Fund), the EU influences what the British government does and can do.’[5] Thus, an important number of departments have attained high European influence and dimension.

The most Europe engaged Departments are: The Treasury, The Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and increasingly since the 1990s the Home Office. These departments have to work very closely to Brussels as ‘the EU is a major source of legislation which must be implemented at the national level.’[6] Today, ministers spend an important proportion of their time in dealing with their European colleagues on EU issues to advance toward similar directions, to bargain and to cooperate on policy development.
Coordination efforts between the Cabinet Office, the Foreign Office and Britain’s Permanent Representation in Brussels are needed in order to deliver consistent responses to EU inputs and to undertake position within the EU institutions that are coherent with the supranational body requirements and directives.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries work very closely with their European colleagues, and Agriculture with the Common Agricultural Policy is one of the most Europeanized activities within the British government. The CAP is today at a European level the source of disputes between member states and Britain because would like to liberalize European agriculture to access to new markets in the developing countries.

Another and very important way in which the EU is woven into the everyday life of the British government involves the judicial application of EU law. The principle of European ‘supremacy’ means that any existing or future status in British law can not take precedence over European legislation. The incorporation of the European Convention on Human rights into British law in 1998 is one of the most, if not the most, important judicial reforms undertaken by British politicians since accession to the EEC. The consequences of these restrictive measures and the superiority of European law over the British one affected for instance the adoption of the new counter-terrorist legislation.

Another aspect of policy interweaving is the Union increasing importance in matters of foreign diplomacy and defence as a consequence of Maastricht and Amsterdam which stipulated the creation of a high representative for the EU. British diplomacy interweaves with the EU particularly in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Consequently, the Foreign Policy and Defence Office, the Minister of Defence, and the Department of International Development has been pragmatically adapted to the increasing salience of the European dimension of British diplomacy;[7]

Other examples are the regional and the environmental policies. In everything concerning water and air it is the EU who takes the decisions and delivers regulations. Indeed, the British Environmental policy can only be understood as a fully European competence since the formalizations of the Maastricht and the Amsterdam treaties. Moreover, ‘the European Court of Justice decisions and Commission enforcements have intensified the pressure to adapt to EU-wide standards, particularly in areas such as water quality standards.’[8] Since 1972, the EU has adopted six environmental policies which focus on waste management and water and air pollution. The last one which will run until 2010 identifies climate change biodiversity and management of natural resources and waste as key issues. The UK is affected in a different way depending on the sector. In some areas such as land use planning, housing and local government finance, the British legislative task is not interwoven with EU legislation; while in areas concerning water quality, as we just saw, is extensively Europeanized being obliged to respect European standards at national level.






Let’s now treat and focus on the areas that are not highly interwoven between the supranational entity and the UK, and the areas where the UK shape the fabric of EU policies by uploading and influencing policy.
Europeanization shall not be seen as a one way process as it is not only Europe in Britain but also Britain in Europe. Britain tries more and more to influence new policies rather than to stay passive. Thus, member states seek in fact to upload their domestic policy approaches to the EU not to suffer drastic changes in the way they conduct their internal affairs. In addition, it must be taken into account that Britain is an active player and pace-setter in the EU. Ministers negotiate with their colleagues of other states of the EU, the British citizens are represented in the EP and British commissioners in the EU Commission seem to be highly influence in the decision-making task.

There are high expectations that commissioners will not act in their own national interest in managing policy but in practice this occurs and their decisions play an important role. For instance, Blair’s close relation to Peter Mandelson who was in charge of the negotiations of the so-called Doha Development Round on WTO-trade talks, can be understood by some observers as a European internal bargain with President Chirac about the 4-billion euros British rebate. Mandelson rose to EU members the concerns expressed and pressures from developing countries to ‘reduce the agricultural tariffs and farms subsidies inherent in the CAP’.[9] Thus the Labour government looked for keeping the rebate or reforming the CAP.

Robin Cook and Tony Blair influenced enlargement to 25 in 1998 when the UK hold the presidency of the EU. The integration of former communist countries to the EU was a long-standing goal for British foreign policy because it also promised a more British approach to European-transatlantic relations. Later on, ‘the failure of the acrimonious Nice summit in December 2000 to agree all changes needed to make the EU fit for enlargement from 15 to 25 led to the establishment of a Constitutional Convention.’[10] Britain understood the necessity of accommodation to the new situation of 25 member states but urged an intergovernmental approach rather than a federal one. British active position in the Convention for the EU constitution can be seen not as a way of EU influence on Britain but the other Way around. The UK fiercely defended what Labour defined as ‘red-line’ issues that included what included taxation, social security and immigration policy, and other issues concerning foreign and defence policies. It also influenced a number of reforms that gave more power and leadership to the European Council.
Furthermore, Blair has also played an influential role in the Lisbon Agenda of economic reform, research, innovation and flexibility of the EU economies in 2000.

Although the EU has permeated several levels of governance in British political life, there is one that is not very successful to influence. That is the level of party system. British politicians do not seem to absorb the EU project into intra-party politics. ‘Eurosceptics on the right articulate concerns about the diminution of nation autonomy and express fear about the emasculation of national identity’[11], while those on the left see Europe as a neoliberal entity that will undermine the welfare-state nation in order to compete in globalization.

Concerning the economic arena, it can not be said that it is Britain who suffers from the opening to globalization and free market policies from the EU. As Schmidt notes, ‘deregulation and privatization came before the European pressures; the Thatcher government was ideologically committed to dismantled state control of an economy that was in any event less state-dominated than either France or Germany.’[12] In fact, Thatcherite reforms in the 1980s finished with the centralized regulatory bodies to bring relatively regulatory ones. Historically, Britain has had a much more open orientation to international trade and the economy did not have to adapt as a much as other EU economies to the promoted neoliberal policy orientation of the Treaty of Rome and its successors. European competition policy may have been imposed by the EU, but British political and economic leans on this area are by nature consistent with the evolving policies demanded by the Commission. Whereas some countries have to change their policies due to EU policies, Britain have had absorbed them without substantially changing its own institutional arrangements. For instance, concerning the deregulation of telecommunications, the UK had already privatised and deregulated the area in 1984


The creation of the EMU cedes economic authority to distant and uncontrollable institutions at a European level. ‘John Maynard Keynes pointed out that: Whoever controls the currency, controls the government.’[13] In fact, who can deny that control of the currency and the economic policy is essential to national sovereignty. The Chancellor of the Exchequer’s five economic tests, and the need for them to be fulfilled in order to adopt the euro, are an indirect way the Labour government has found not to treat the controversy issue of adopting the single currency. Gordon Brown did not want to give up this crucial component of sovereignty, as the Labour government wanted to be able to control inflation and interest rates. ‘The Blair government has remained actively in pushing reform, despite Britain’s exclusion from eurozone. Britain has pressed for completion of the single market in energy, telecommunications and financial services, as well as reductions in regulations and more flexible labour, capital and product markets.’[14]

Moreover, it can not be said that British social policies are fully Europeanized. When the UK joint the EC in 1973 became subject of the social policies contained in Articles 118-23 of the Treaty of Rome. In 1992 Major secured and opt-out from Maastricht’s social chapter but Blair’s Labour government adopt this social policy following their election in June 1997. It must also be said that the commission has not looked to impose welfare states economic ‘constrains’ in socio-cultural areas as theses areas are highly ’un-Europeanized.’ On the contrary, it has been seen in recent years Britain influence in social matters on other countries since unemployment in continental Europe is a primary concern. The promotion of employment began with the White Paper on Competitiveness, Growth and Employment, the Essen European Council, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Special European Council in 2000. The means to address these problems were uploaded from British work flexible market and flexibility policies Labour have undertaken in employment issues.

Foreign policy cooperation is not as much supranationalized as other areas such as agriculture, and it rather retains a strong intergovernmental focus. Although the Treaty of Nice included the gradual formulation of a common defence policy, the CFSP is decidedly intergovernmental as the Commission is weak and the European Council holds the upper hand. With the Iraq conflict, it was absolutely clear Blair’s government allegiance to the USA and the belief to that any British foreign policy decision needed to be linked to strong transatlantic ties. On this issue to talk of an interwoven decision-making would be out of reality.

Finally, matters of Justice and Home Affairs, immigration, asylum, policing and judicial cooperation were formalized by Maastricht but remained principally structures of intergovernmental cooperation from which the European Parliament, the Commission and the ECJ were largely excluded. Schengen, which was initially set by Germany, France and the Benelux in 1985, was another policy in which the UK sought not to joint the EU policy later brought by Amsterdam as Britain opted out of the treaty’s Title IV.





In order to shed light on Moran’s assumption according to which the everyday fabric of British policy is woven with the EU, we shall remember that contemporary Britain faces‘multilevel governance’ as it is subject to European and international commitments, and new patterns on policy making as a consequence of devolution. In fact, devolution has given Britain a more decentralize appearance, something common in a number of European countries such as Germany, Spain or Italy, making it looked quasi-federal itself. Today, the administration of EU structural funds which finance public work projects are since 1999 in the hands of the devolved institutions of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.
Moreover, it must be said that the EU fits better with federalized or regionalized states such as Spain, Germany or Italy because the nations are used to deal with multilevel governing practices. Indeed, ‘the EU federalises the institutional structures of all of its member states-as national executives have become EU-level decision-makers in exchange for giving up national autonomy.’[15] But this quasi-federal system on the contrary enables unitary states like Britain and France to project their preferences on policies to the EU in the process of European integration. Unitary States have greater capacity when applying EU directives because the concentration of power in the core executive enables greater authority over the regions and demands less negotiation as in federal or regionalised states.

Before concluding it shall as well be remember that the ‘unwritten’ British constitution has been reshaped by interplay between national and European policies, the EU system and the British polity ‘appears to be characterized by complex feed back loops.’ Thus, European inputs on the British political system rarely enter without modification because the EU let a large margin to countries to adapt to new policies.

‘Almost all aspects of domestic policy now possess a European dimension, although some areas are more institutionalized at EU level with associated consequences for domestic policy-making of common policies.’[16] Some departments are undeniably more European, others such as the Treasury one continue to avoid the European construction of the single currency. Moreover, the UK has opted out of various EU policies such as the Social Chapter, the Title IV of the Amsterdam Treaty and the final state of the European Monetary Union.


Moran statement on the EU interconnection with the everyday fabric of British politics is broadly right but it would be exaggerated to claim this happens in every area. The EU is with no doubt more than an external influence as it has brought changes in British institutions, but it has not Europeanized all of them. Britain had comparatively little problem in adapting to EU economic regulation with regard to France or Italy because Britain has reformed before EU requirements and transformed its economic governance rules in response to globalization; however in environmental areas transformation has been keenly important where the UK underwent the greatest transformation.



BIBLIOGRAPHY:


MORAN, Michael: Politics and Governance in the UK, Palgrave, 2005. Chapter 4 and 6.

DUNLEAVY, Patrick, el al.: Developments in British Politics 8, Palgrave, 2006. Chapter 9 Michael Smith: Britain, Europe and the World.

GEDDES, Andrew: The European Union and British Politics. Chapter 7: Britain and European Union Policies.

SELDON, Anthony and KAVANAGH Dennis (eds): The Blair Effect 2001-5, Cambridge University Press, 2005. Chapter 16: Peter Riddell: Europe.

RUSH, Michael and GIDDINGS, Philip (eds): The Palgrave Review of British politics 2005, Palgrave 2006. Chapter 15: Tim Bale: Britain and Europe: Less of the Poison?

SCHMIDT, Vivien A.: Adapting to Europe: Is it harder for Britain? The Journal of Politics and International Relations, VOL. 8 No1 February 2006.

DUNLEAVY, Patrick et al (eds): Developments in British Politics 7, Palgrave, 2003. Chapter 3 Ben Rosamond: The Europeanization of British Politics.

DOREY, Peter: Policy Making in Britain. An introduction, Sage 2005. Chapter 8: from Government to Governance.





[1] SCHMIDT, Vivien A.: Adapting to Europe: Is it harder for Britain? The Journal of Politics and International Relations, VOL. 8 No1 February 2006. p.28.
[2] SCHMIDT, Vivien A.: Adapting to Europe: Is it harder for Britain? The Journal of Politics and International Relations, VOL. 8 No1 February 2006. p.16.

[3] DUNLEAVY, Patrick et al (eds): Developments in British Politics 7, Palgrave, 2003. Chapter 3 Ben Rosamond: The Europeanization of British Politics. P. 45.
[4] MORAN, Michael: Politics and Governance in the UK, Palgrave, 2005. Chapter 4. p.67.
[5] DUNLEAVY, Patrick, el al.: Developments in British Politics 8, Palgrave, 2006. Chapter 9 Michael Smith: Britain, Europe and the World. P. 162.
[6] DUNLEAVY, Patrick, el al.: Developments in British Politics 8, Palgrave, 2006. Chapter 9 Michael Smith: Britain, Europe and the World. P. 160.

[7]ALLEN and OLIVER 2006; HOCKING and SPENCE 2003 in: DUNLEAVY, Patrick, el al.: Developments in British Politics 8, Palgrave, 2006. Chapter 9 Michael Smith: Britain, Europe and the World. P. 162.
[8] GEDDES, Andrew: The European Union and British Politics. Chapter 7: Britain and European Union Policies. p.135.
[9] RUSH, Michael and GIDDINGS, Philip (eds): The Palgrave Review of British politics 2005, Palgrave 2006. Chapter 15: Tim Bale: Britain and Europe: Less of the Poison? P.221.
[10] SELDON, Anthony and KAVANAGH Dennis (eds): The Blair Effect 2001-5, Cambridge University Press, 2005. Chapter 16: Peter Riddell: Europe. P. 374.
[11] DUNLEAVY, Patrick et al (eds): Developments in British Politics 7, Palgrave, 2003. Chapter 3 Ben Rosamond: The Europeanization of British Politics. P. 41.
[12] SCHMIDT 1997: 172 in DUNLEAVY, Patrick et al (eds): Developments in British Politics 7, Palgrave, 2003. Chapter 3 Ben Rosamond: The Europeanization of British Politics. P. 48.
[13] GEDDES, Andrew: The European Union and British Politics. Chapter 7: Britain and European Union Policies. p.143.
[14] SELDON, Anthony and KAVANAGH Dennis (eds): The Blair Effect 2001-5, Cambridge University Press, 2005. Chapter 16: Peter Riddell: Europe. P. 377.
[15] SCHMIDT, Vivien A.: Adapting to Europe: Is it harder for Britain? The Journal of Politics and International Relations, VOL. 8 No1 February 2006. p. 19.
[16] GEDDES, Andrew: The European Union and British Politics. Chapter 7: Britain and European Union Policies. p.158.