The end of the Cold War has left the United States as the sole superpower. America had a tremendous preponderance since the bipolarity that had characterised the world for the last four decades had disappeared. President Clinton took power in 1993 and became the first president to be elected in the Post-Cold War period. His predecessor, President George W. H. Bush, had to deal with the end of the Cold War but his four-year term was more a period of stabilization of the global geopolitical situation than one of new doctrines and strategic development of a new foreign policy. Although Bush announced that it was time for a ‘New World Order’ this concept was merely rhetoric, the substance of his foreign policy was to keep the Status Quo since the consolidation of capitalism favoured the American geopolitical and economic hegemony.
When William Clinton took office, there was no real threat to American preponderance and this unprecedented position gave him a tremendous freedom of action. He had to formulate a strategy in a post-Cold War era which was full of uncertainty but also of opportunity. ‘The United States had an enduring interest in peace, because a major global conflict would threaten his preeminence.’[1]Even though the democratic chief executive had less experience in matters of foreign policy than his pragmatic predecessor, he understood the necessity of having some clear guiding principles in foreign policy affairs not to rely on ad hoc basis. But his new approach was not a conventional one, ‘the Clinton administration perceived a strong connection between the domestic and foreign realms. What engaged Clinton most after all, was the economy, and he and his advisers, to a degree than Cold War administrations, appreciated the intimate relationship between the domestic and international economies.[2]’ Consequently, it can be said that since most citizens were uninterested in foreign policy due to the preponderance of American power, they elected a President in 1992 and a Congress (two third of Rep. Senators did not have passports) in 1994, which were much more concerned in domestic matter than in foreign policy issues. Therefore, it must be expected that if a ‘grand strategy existed’, it had to be shape in relation to people and government’s features.
Considering that there was no clear political, economic and military opponent when Clinton came to power; Was Clinton then successful in creating a new strategic design to expand or maintain the favour existing situation? To better analyse the Clinton administration foreign policy accomplishments and failures in setting a ‘grand strategy’ if there was one, we shall firstly deal with what his ‘doctrine’ was, that is to say what and why Clinton attempts to establish a new different approach to foreign policy. In a second term, we shall treat the negative points, failures and lack of support that his administration faced during the two terms the former Governor of Arkansas resided as Commander-in-chief. And lastly in a third instance, we shall focus in the existence of such a Clinton’s ‘strategic design’, and analyse what positive achievements brought his foreign policy and how logic it was. Only after answering these questions we shall be able to say whether Clinton was successful devising a grand strategy.
When we focus on the Administration’s foreign policy we must underline that many of the Clinton’s foreign advisers had already worked during the presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981). The top foreign policy posts of his cabinet participants were Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, Anthony Lake as National Security Advisor, Will Perry as Secretary of Defense, and Madeleine Albright as US ambassador to the United Nations. It was not unexpected that during the first year of mandate the administration approached foreign policy in an idealistic way. This first phase was called economic engagement and prone a liberal internationalist approach which focus in the building of economic ties between the international community and the United States. As we already said, the Clinton administration saw domestic security very much tied to foreign policy. The director of the NSC, Anthony Lake, declared that the larger pool of democracies disseminated in the world, the greater American security and prosperity. The administration claimed that democracies are less likely to make war to each other.
With the creation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in 1993, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), after the Uruguay Round, in 1994 (which its predecessor was the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), Clinton searched the stabilization and the creation of new democracies by deepening the concept of free market economies and by seeking the development of Big Emerging Markets (BEM). The administration underlined the importance of interdependence by arguing that ‘free trades and open markets don’t just promote economic advancement and democracy. They also promote a stable world political order[3]’, which of course favoured America. It was also added that as countries engage more in trade, their economies become more specialize. This evolution leading to interdependence between foreign markets and foreign goods creates mutual economic dependence and prosperity. Furthermore, this idea was back by the concept the 1950s sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset developed. Lipset claimed that ‘economic development tends to increase the general level of education, which promotes changes in political culture and political attitudes. These, in turn, encourage democracy.[4] The concept of trade as actor which ‘socializes’ countries can be clearly observed in the approach toward China of the Clinton administration.
However, because of different international events as Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Russia and the Middle East, the administration had to adapt his international approach. As a matter of fact, a greater commitment to international developments had to be taken, but the question was to what extent. The US should adopt a foreign policy which should be between neo-isolationism and global interventionism. These second phase in Clinton’s foreign policy, which extended itself since the late 1993 to circa 1995, was called ‘Democratic Engagement and Enlargement’ and sought to give more coherence and structure to the administration ‘grand design’. The approach continued to aim the opening of new market economies but had a more realistic slant.
The administration started to embrace greater commitment to liberal internationalism and made clear that the US would act unilaterally or multilaterally. This new degree of realism can be observed with Lake’s assertion that ‘only one overriding factor can determine whether the US should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and this is America’s interests.’
It was still argued that economic cooperation and not conflict motivated the evolution and proper behaviour of states which led to democracy. Democratic and market values persisted to form and inseparable group in Clinton’s viewpoint.
‘Finally, the Administration backed the idea of enlargement because it was convinced that democracy more generally contributed to global stability and security, especially in those countries that were in transition from communism to capitalism[5].’
In 1995, as a consequence of the criticism of the press about foreign interventions as Haiti, Somalia or Bosnia; and due to Republicans who argued that the executive branch had no effective foreign policy, the Clinton administration became even more realistic. Clinton reshuffled his advisors and secretaries appointing M. Albright as Secretary of State, William Cohen as Secretary of Defense and Sandy Berger at the head of the NSC.
Selective engagement, which was the new administration approach, meant that the US was going to continue to lead the world affairs but now was going to engage only if American interest were at stake, that is to say on matter of national criteria. The United States would be willing to use military force but only if diplomacy failed and the use of force was the last option. As a matter of fact, ‘the administration’s use of the diplomatic and economic tools of foreign policy has been far more adept than its use of military force’[6]
Moreover, it made clear that America had fewer predispositions to multilateral actions and would be more amenable to act unilaterally. It would also focus more in stabilizing the relation between key states and less on remaking the international system. In other words the economic and military goals lost some ground and the military and political ones gained primacy.
Let’s now focus in the negative points, failures and lack of support that the democratic administration had concerning foreign policy matters. Clinton was accused by critics to be a president who only cared about domestic policies and who did not understood foreign policy issues. These claims were more specifically made during the first year of his mandate, it was later clear that different voices and opinions characterized his foreign policy cabinet. The cacophony of different viewpoints and the lack of a strong spokesperson did not give credibility to the competence of his staff and at that time the foreign policy was seen as incoherent, contradictory, indecisive and lacking of purpose and vision. ‘Republicans routinely criticised him for abandoning Bush’s geopolitical axioms in favour of an excessively commercial and humanitarian foreign policy.’[7]
Being democracy enlargement Clinton’s plan, for opponents the administration had no clear guide arguing that the strategy was incomplete as it did not specify how to promote democracy. Reviewers claimed that another mischief of the administration concerning this theme was the belief that ‘market economies’ could only work in democratic states and they added that Clinton failed by making universal that what had work in America had also to work abroad. This kind of ‘universalism’ of American democratic values is close to what Cox describes the ‘Wilsonian fallacy of trying to make other countries assume a form of government for which they were probably not suited and certainly unwilling to adopt.’[8]
As Clinton saw that domestic and foreign policies were ‘two faces of the same coin’, critics claimed that ‘while he cared deeply about the global economy, he viewed it primarily through the eyes of a domestic policy president striving to sustain American prosperity by winning access to foreign markets.[9]’
It was also advanced that the administration failed to act quickly in the Balkans, did not succeed to challenge China over human rights, and did not commit to engagement in the genocide of Rwanda.
It was also declared that ‘by using an ultimatum at the Rambouillet conference that Serbia was certain to reject, the United States most likely provoked what could have been an avoidable war[10].’ It was for this reason that many critics stated Clinton’s responsibility causing the war in the Balkans without anticipating the terrible consequences.
But if the human right record in the ex-Yugoslavia was ambiguous, the errors in Rwanda were tragic because ‘despite clear signs that mass slaughter was being planned there, the United States helped derail the U.N. peace effort.[11]’
In terms of relationship with other great foreign power, the deteriorating understanding to Russia was seen as very negative. The empathy with Russia declined as a consequence of the expansion of NATO, the indifference to Russian interests in the Balkans, Chechnya and Caspian Basin and the scrapped of the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Concerning the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Clinton failed to convince the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty allowing China and India to reach as sophisticated WMD as American ones. Moreover, he is blame for not persuading Pakistan and India to avoid nuclear weapon testing in 1998; for not preventing the collapse of the UN inspections in Iraq; and for the unclear and ambiguous outcome of the Agreements with North Korea in 1994.
Thirdly, we have now the necessity to treat Clinton’s legacy, analyse what positive achievements brought his foreign policy and explain if these policies were part of a grand design.
Not to treat Clinton’s world economic strategy as a ‘grand design’ policy would be a significant mistake. Clinton profoundly believed that economic interdependence and democracy created peace and kept the world order which significantly favoured American interests. In fact, ‘in the minds of American leaders, including President Truman, the fundamental case of both wars was the rise of illiberal, autocratic states.’[12]Of course, for people who understand ‘grand strategy’ in terms of conventional military deterrence, containment or a race toward armament will not see it the same way. But, ‘ if grand strategy is defined as a coherent set of foreign policies aimed at the overall strengthening of the country’s position in the world, then the promotion of democracy and the other liberal order-building impulses constitute such a grand strategy.’[13]
In some way when Clinton came to power he found himself in a similar position to Truman’s 1947 one. President Truman then decided to create the National Security Council and the CIA in order to deal with the communist threat in terms of geopolitical and economical security. But when Clinton came to office capitalism had already defeated communism, so he decided to expand capitalist throughout the world by wedding domestic policy and foreign policy. Clinton created the NEC (National Economic Council) as a response to a new era in world politics. The NEC was a cluster of economic agencies that can be compared to Truman’s creation of the NSC. In addition, the head of the NEC, the secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin and the director of the Office of Management and Budget were always present in the meetings of the NSC. Clinton put a lot of emphases in the necessity that the NEC and the NSC work together.
Furthermore, in order to promote American economic hegemony, to stabilize the BEM markets for American investments and to establish a definitive ‘new world order’ where free market societies rule, Clinton called for the strengthening of the International Monetary Found and the World Bank.
The weight of economy in foreign policy matters can be clearly observed in the relation toward China where the Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin had played a much important role in shaping and influencing the Chinese than Secretary of State Madeleine Albright or NSC director Berger.
Another reason President Clinton saw to influence the world order in an indirect way through economy was that Americans were uninterested about foreign policy and that they cared more for the domestic economic prosperity. Clinton, a liberal who opposed the Vietnam War and understood its lessons, did not approve direct military intervention unless it was the last solution. Moreover, people where against money spending and life losses in regions where America had no interest and in places they did not even know where to situate.
‘In many ways, the Clinton approach has deep roots in the Founder’s vision of commerce as the essence of democracy.’[14] His grand design, which tied at the same time economic and foreign policies, resulted in the creation of 240 separate trade agreements, the tearing down of barriers to US goods and investment and the creation of the WTO and NAFTA. Positive outcome consequences of the latter accords were the greatest economic prosperity in American history, the creation of 1.7 millions jobs related to export, a low unemployment rate throughout both of his terms, the strengthening of democracy in Latin America, Asia and some former communist countries and more importantly by keeping of the status quo which preserved American preponderance in economic, military and geopolitical issues in the world.
Even though many critics have been made to his conventional foreign policies in crisis like Somalia and Bosnia, it must be said that he did not inherit a positive legacy in those areas from Bush’s mandate. In issues like the CTBT or the missile defence, ‘its principal mistakes have come in to partisan pressure at home’[15]. It must be remembered that since the 1994 mid-term elections President Clinton governed without majority in the Congress.
What it is hardly criticisable to the Clinton administration is the expansion of the NATO to ex-Soviet communist satellites such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary; the leadership the administration showed in Kosovo and Bosnia, the stabilization of relations with China; the role it played in the Good Friday Agreements; the continuous engagement in the search of peace in the Middle East; the reduction of the threat of WMD when persuading Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to give up their inherited-Soviet arsenal; the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention; and the agreements to freeze and dismantled the nuclear program with North Korea in the late 1990s.
The Cold War was a war of economic ideologies in which capitalism opposed communism. Since the Truman doctrine every American president had tried to defeat communism by means of idealistic and realistic conceptions of foreign policy. In the 1990s, after the fall of communism, President Clinton successfully consolidated the capitalist market economy throughout the world and deepened American economic hegemony. His administration stabilized the world order, in a period where much was to lose, by means of economic geopolitical strategy. This essay has demonstrated that Clinton’s ‘grand strategy’ existed but was not a conventional military one. In fact, being no potential military threat and having high levels of unemployment and twin deficits in the domestic economy, the Commander-in-Chief focused in an economic foreign policy which would promote democracy abroad and bring prosperity at home.
His grand design was based on the enlargement of free market economies and democracies. The creation of the NEC, the NAFTA, the WTO and the strengthening of the Big Emerging Markets’ economies were silent hidden undeclared weapons of global financial domination. These commercial treaties enabled the enlargement of American economic preponderance in the world by opening new markets to American investments and exportable goods. Furthermore, trough globalization Clinton committed America to be involved and to lead world affairs. Even though the administration failed to deal with some crisis and had to adapt itself during the eight years of mandate, it can not be said that Clinton was unsuccessful in devising a grand strategy. As this paper has revealed, despite the greater degree of realism in Clinton’s second term, the administration always maintained for the necessity of an economic engagement. To shape the world affairs and to keep American preponderance not a conventional foreign policy was needed but a new economic tactic approach.
In addition, it can not be said that Clinton’s foreign policy is a continuation of Bush’s because when the Republican only talked of promotion of global trade and of a new world order. Bush’s statements concerning these matters were mainly rhetoric
To conclude, the reader gains the impression that Clinton’s grand strategy seems to be a logic response to the development of world events. Once communism defeated, the time for capitalist expansionism should come.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
McCormick, ‘The Clinton Administration: Foreign Policy after the Cold War’, 4th edition, 2004, chapter 6, 215-320.
Michael Cox, ‘Wilsonian Resurgent? The Clinton Administration and the Promotion of Democracy,’ in M. Cox et al (eds), American Democracy Promotion, pp.218-242
John Ikenberry, ‘Why export Democracy? The ‘Hidden Grand Strategy’ of American Foreign Policy,’ The Wilsonian Quarterly, 23/1, 1999.
Stephen Walt, ‘Two cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy,‘ Foreign Affairs, 2000, pp 63-79.
Richard A. Melason, ‘American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The search of Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush,’ 4th edition, 2005, pp. 233-287.
Colin Campbell, Bert A. Rockman, ‘The Clinton Legacy, Engaging the World: First Impressions of the Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy ‘chapter 10 (Emily Goldman and Larry Bernman), 2000.
D. McKay, ‘American Politics and Society,’ 5th edition, 2001, chapter 16: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War, The American World Role, pp. 311-317.
Davies, McKeever, ‘Politics USA’, chapter 21: Foreign Policy in the 1990s, 2nd edition, 2006, pp. 340-347.
[1] Stephen Walt, ‘Two cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy, ‘Foreign Affairs, 2000, p 67.
[2] Richard A. Melason, ‘American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The search of Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush,’ 4th edition, 2005, p 240.
[3] John Ikenberry, ‘Why export Democracy? The ‘Hidden Grand Strategy’ of American Foreign Policy,’ The Wilsonian Quarterly, p.4.
[4] John Ikenberry, ‘Why export Democracy? The ‘Hidden Grand Strategy’ of American Foreign Policy,’ The Wilsonian Quarterly, p.3.
[5] Thomas Carrothers, ‘Democracy’, Foreign Policy, 107 (1997), pp.11-18.
[6] Colin Campbell, Bert A. Rockman, ‘The Clinton Legacy, Engaging the World: First Impressions of the Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy ‘chapter 10 (Emily Goldman and Larry Bernman), 2000, p.230.
[7] Richard A. Melason, ‘American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The search of Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush,’ 4th edition, 2005, p 284
[8] Michael Cox, ‘Wilsonian Resurgent? The Clinton Administration and the Promotion of Democracy,’ in M. Cox et al (eds), American Democracy Promotion, pp.219.
[9] Richard A. Melason, ‘American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The search of Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush,’ 4th edition, 2005, p 281.
[10] Stephen Walt, ‘Two cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy‘ Foreign Affairs, 2000, p 76.
[11] Stephen Walt, ‘Two cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy‘ Foreign Affairs, 2000, p 77.
[12] John Ikenberry, ‘Why export Democracy? The ‘Hidden Grand Strategy’ of American Foreign Policy,’ The Wilsonian Quarterly, p.2.
[13] John Ikenberry, ‘Why export Democracy? The ‘Hidden Grand Strategy’ of American Foreign Policy,’ The Wilsonian Quarterly, p. 6.
[14] Colin Campbell, Bert A. Rockman, ‘The Clinton Legacy, Engaging the World: First Impressions of the Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy ‘chapter 10 (Emily Goldman and Larry Bernman), 2000, p.238.
[15] Stephen Walt, ‘Two cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy‘ Foreign Affairs, 2000, p 74.
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